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A Comparison of Security Modelling Languages used for Security Risk 
Management 
Abstract 
Nowadays, every company that has valuable assets has an urge to protect them. Unfortunately, it 
is impossible to act on every single security threat. To mitigate these threats Security Modelling 
Languages were extended to use for Security Risk Management. However, choosing suitable 
language can be a difficult decision, because it can be a problem to compare those languages and 
decide which one would bring the most cost-effective solution. 
Every security solution has its cost and companies have limited resources. The chosen language 
that will be used for Security Risk Management must suit the company’s needs, as it is important 
in terms of getting positive ROI (Risk on investment). In addition, Security Risk Management 
takes place on early stages of IS development and choosing security modelling language that 
does not suit the company’s needs will result in a loss of time as well as possible system 
vulnerabilities. 
Our technical contribution to the solution to this problem is a comparison of these Security 
Modelling Languages: BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse cases and Mal-activity diagrams. It is 
important to determine how these languages act with Information System Security Risk 
Management (ISSRM) domain model. The comparison is made based on the case study and 
empirical research in order to understand the semiotic clarity of these languages used to express 
the security concerns. The empirical research within the case study will allow us to point out in 
which ways one language acts better than another regarding ISSRM. 
The chosen security modelling languages contain limitations regarding the semiotic clarity, as 
they were not designed to deal with the security risk management at the first place, but used in 
terms of ISSRM, they help to mitigate risks starting from early stages of IS development. 
Keywords: 
Asset, Threat, Modelling Languages, Risk Management, IS development, Vulnerabilities, 
Domain model, Mitigate 
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Julgeolekuriskide juhtimisel kasutatavate modelleerimiskeelte võrdlus 
Kokkuvõte 
Tänapaeval kõik firmad, mis omavad väärtuslikke varasid, püüavad oma aktiva ja pasiva kaitsta. 
Kahjuks ei ole võimalik reageerida kõikidele varade turvalisust puudutavaid 
ähvardustele. Selliste võimalike ohtude leevendamiseks olid laiendatud 
modelleerimiskeeled turvariskide halduse kasutamiseks. Sobiva keele valik võib aga olla 
keeruline otsus, kuna see on iseenesest ränk küsimus, kuidas need keeled omavahel võrrelda ning 
otsustada kumb lahendus on rentaabel. 
Iga turvateenusel on oma hind, kuigi firmad on oma eelarvega piiratud. Konkreetne valitud keel 
turvariski haldamiseks peab vastama firma vajadustele, kuna see on tähtis positiivse “ROI” 
(investeeringu risk) suhtes. Samas turvariski haldus asub infosüsteemi arendamise varajasel 
staadiumil ja keele valik, mis ei vasta firma vajadustele, võib viita aja kaotusele või isegi 
süsteemi turvaaukudele. 
Selle probleemi lahenduseks on meie tehniline panus võrrelda modelleerimiskeel: “BPMN”, 
“Secure Tropos”, “Misuse case” ja “Mal-activity” diagramm. On tähtis määratlema, kuidas need 
keeled toimivad infosüsteemi turvariskide haldamine (ingl. ISSRM) domeeni mudeliga. 
Juhtumisel ja empiitilisel analüüsil põhinev võrdlus oli tehtud selleks, et selgust saada turvalisuse 
probleeme puudutavatest keeltest ja nende semiootilisest selgusest. Empiiriline analüüs juhtumi 
analüüsiga võimaldab välja selgitada, mismoodi üks keel toimib paremini kui teine “ISSRM” 
suhtes. 
Valitud modeleerimiskeeled turvariskide halduseks on mingil määral piiratud semiootilise 
selguse suhtes, kuna need pole olnud esialgu mõeldud tegelema turvariskide haldusega, 
pigem “ISSRM” kasutamiseks ning selleks, et aidata ohud leevendada infosüsteemi 
arendamise varajasel staadiumil. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Omand, vara, modeleerimiskeeled, turvariskide haldis., infosüsteemi arendus, infosüsteemi turva 
aukud, domeeni mudel 
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1 Introduction 
Security risk management (SRM) plays a vital role in modern information system development 
process. It assists in lowering the possible risks and costs by considering these risk at early stages 
of development. However, the role of SRM is often overlooked which results in considering risks 
only during the implementation or maintenance process of an information system [7]. Such 
action leads to insufficient security level as well as high cost of risk treatment. 
Modelling languages (e.g. BPMN [5], Secure Tropos [9], Misuse Cases [9], Mal-Activity 
Diagrams [10]) assist human stakeholders in terms of SRM. These languages provide means to 
early identify and treat possible risks which can occur during different stages of development, 
implementation and maintenance processes. 
In this paper we compare security modelling languages regarding comprehension of different 
language concepts by human stakeholders. Our scope includes BPMN which is widely used for 
modeling business processes using the graphical presentation of different aspects [4], Secure 
Tropos which are based on Tropos methodology (use of Actor, Goal, Task, Resource and 
Dependency concepts) [8], Misuse Cases which as opposed to traditional Use Cases present 
essentially structured story of system misuse [9], and Mal-Activity Diagrams which main idea is 
presenting the activities leading to negative impact on a system [10]. 
Our main research question is: “What of the presented SRM languages is better understood in 
terms of concepts comprehension [11] and language constructs by the human stakeholders than 
the other?” In order to answer this question we needed to compare the modelling languages. Our 
first step was to understand the concepts of Information Systems Security Risk Modelling 
(ISSRM) domain [11]. Afterwards, we used the modelling languages to construct the models on 
one particular case basis. These models were further given to an audience with a view to 
understand how human stakeholders comprehend different models and language constructs. 
In Chapter 2 we present ISSRM concepts and domain, both used in terms of the comparison 
basis. Chapter 3 introduces the SRM languages and delivers their models. In Chapter 4 we 
introduce our study and the results of the collected data analysis. Lastly, in Chapter 5 we discuss 
the results of the study and make a conclusion. 
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2 Domain Model 
Information Systems Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is an extremely important activity 
regarding the development of secure systems. Its main goal is to use risk management approach 
to protect assets of an organization from all dangers to IS security which are possibly to occur. 
Its domain model presents the concepts of ISSRM and how they relate to one another. In this 
section we summarize some core definitions of ISSRM concepts, organized in three categories: 
asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk-treatment related concepts [1]. 
2.1 Core definitions 
Asset 
Asset-related concepts define which assets of an organization need to be protected. Assets are 
everything that have a value to a company and are important in terms of achieving its goals. A 
business asset introduces valuable information, processes, capabilities and skills important to the 
business of the organization. An IS asset is a part of the information system (IS) supporting 
business assets. Security criterion which is defined in terms of business assets are usually 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. However, considering the context, other criterion can 
also be added [1]. 
Risk 
Risk-related concepts describe the risk and how exactly it can occur. Risk is a combination of 
Event and Impact which describe negative effects harming company’s assets. Event introduces 
the occasion that had led to the Impact. Event concept consists of Threat and Vulnerability 
concepts. Vulnerability is a characteristic of an IS asset which shows through which place of a 
system an attack can be carried out. Threat itself is a combination of Threat agent and Attack 
method concepts which describe an agent that has an intention to harm organization’s assets and 
an attack technique that the agent is using to exploit the Vulnerability [1]. 
Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment-related concepts introduce the decisions to treat identified Risks. Risk treatment 
presents methods to mitigate the risks. Security requirement is a refinement of a Risk treatment 
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to mitigate the risk. Control is designed to improve the security defined by the Security 
requirement and is implemented to work with it [1]. 
2.2 ISSRM Domain Model 
The ISSRM domain model presented in Fig. 1 is a result of an alignment of all three principal 
groups of ISSRM concepts: (i) asset-related concepts, (ii) risk-related concepts, and (iii) risk 
treatment-related concepts. The name for each concept as well as the relationships on which the 
concepts are linked were identified in [11]. 
 
FIGURE 1: ISSRM DOMAIN MODEL [12] 
The presented ISSRM domain model highlights the main ISSRM concepts and their 
relationships, together with their corresponding definitions [11].  
2.3 Risk Management 
Security Risk Management process is an iterative event and can be performed many times until 
acceptable level of satisfaction is achieved. The process is shown in Fig. 2. It consists of 6 stages 
[3]: 
Step 1. Context and asset identification 
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At the start of RM process we need to outline the company’s context and valuable assets. In this 
step we need to analyze the organization and the IS in depth. 
Step 2. Determination of security objectives 
At this stage, security objectives of the organization are 
defined. These objectives are based on the organization’s 
assets and they are usually described in terms of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability properties of the 
assets. 
Step 3. Risk analysis and assessment 
Risk analysis is the most important step of RM. At this stage 
the organization’s assets as well as the security objectives 
must be taken into consideration in order to define risks that 
appear as threats to them. Risk level is also identified. Unless 
risk assessment is considered as satisfactory, these 3 steps of 
ISSRM process are performed iteratively (as shown in Fig. 
2).  
Step 4. Risk treatment 
Risk treatment measures can include avoiding, reducing, 
transferring or retaining risk [3]: 
a. Risk avoiding means trying to exclude usage of risky functionality 
b. Risk reducing is applying security requirements or any other measures in order to lessen 
the probability of risk taking place. 
c. Transferring risk is sharing the risk consequences with another party.  
d. Retaining risk means accepting the risk because its probability is very low or the loss is 
inconsiderable. 
Step 5. Security requirements definition 
FIGURE 2: RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS 
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Security requirements on the IS can thus be determined as security solutions to mitigate the risks 
[3]. If security requirements are considered as unsatisfactory, risk treatment step or all the 
preceding steps should be repeated. 
Step 6. Control selection and implementation 
At this point security requirements are realized as real solutions to mitigate risks (e.g., firewalls, 
security systems). As mentioned above, ISSRM process is iterative and should be repeated 
unless risk treatment is considered as satisfactory.  
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter we overviewed the main concepts of Information Systems Security Risk 
Management. We defined its core definitions regarding asset-, risk- and risk treatment-related 
concepts. In addition to it we presented its domain model with all three groups of concepts linked 
to each other (Fig. 1) and presented Risk Management process (Fig. 2) including its executable 
steps. 
In the next chapter we will introduce the concepts and syntax of four security modelling 
languages (BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases, Mal-Activity Diagrams) which we will use to 
create the models based on which the comparison will be carried out. 
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3  Modelling Languages 
In this chapter we present four security modelling languages that are used for security risk 
management: Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases and 
Mal-Activity Diagrams. We will define the core concepts of these languages, outline the general 
purpose of each of them and see how they could be applied in terms of ISSRM regarding one 
particular case. 
3.1 Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a standard for business process modeling that 
provides a graphical notation for specifying business processes in a Business Process Diagram 
(BPD) [5]. BPMN is an essential part of IS development, as it helps to specify standard and 
optimized workflows of organization. The primary purpose of BPMN is modelling of the 
business processes for both technical users and business users, by providing a notation that is 
intuitive to business users, yet able to represent complex process semantics. The notation must be 
understandable by all by all business stakeholders (e.g., analysts, managers). BPMN acts as a 
bridge between business process design and implementation. 
 
FIGURE 3: BPMN COMBINED MODEL 
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FIGURE 4: BPMN - ASSET-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 4: The business asset is the most valuable asset that has to be secured at any cost. In 
BPMN it is defined using tasks and data objects (see Credentials). As we already mentioned, 
the business asset needs to stay secure, therefore, the confidentiality of Credentials is also 
considered (see lock icon at Credentials). Business asset is supported by IS assets that are 
defined using Pool (see System) and Tasks (see Submit login and password and Grant access 
to DB). 
 
FIGURE 5: BPMN - RISK-RELATED CONCEPTS 
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Figure 5: Security threat is defined using BPMN structure for threat agent (see Pool Violator) 
plus message flow that follows the task (see Possible credentials -> Submit login and 
password). The risk event is possible because of a security vulnerability that is defined using 
BPMN Text annotation (see Infinite tries of submitting allowed). The main problem is that 
when a person submits invalid login and password the system allows him/her to repeat this step 
infinitely. This results in Violator getting access to the database (see task Grant access to DB). 
In this particular situation the confidentiality of our business asset is negated (see unlocked icon 
at data object Credentials). 
 
FIGURE 6: BPMN - RISK TREATMENT-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 6: Security criterion (a way to satisfy the security needs the way that reduce the chances 
of risk event happening) is presented using a combination of such BPMN constructs as Task (see 
Check number of tries and Block IP address) and Gateway (see Compare the number). It 
mitigates our risk that confidentiality of credentials can be broken and prevents threat agent from 
using the vulnerability that infinite tries of submitting allowed. 
3.2 Secure Tropos 
Secure Tropos is based on the Tropos methodology, which uses the concepts of actor (entity that 
has strategic goals and intentionality), goal (an actor’s strategic interest), soft-goal (goal without 
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clear criteria whether it is satisfied or not), task (it represents the way of doing something), 
resource (it represents a physical or informational entity, without intentionality) and social 
dependencies (indicate that one actor depends on another in order to attain some goals, execute 
some tasks, or deliver a resource) [8]. It extends the Tropos methodology by adding security 
concerns during the development process. In particular, Secure Tropos extends the Tropos 
language as well as its development process. The language extension consists of redefining 
existing concepts with security in mind as well as introducing new concepts. 
 
FIGURE 7: SECURE TROPOS - ASSET-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 7: Development of the Secure Tropos model starts with the social actor dependency 
analysis. In this figure two dependencies are defined between actors User and the System. A 
Security criterion (e.g. Confidentiality of User credentials) restricts Submit login and password 
and contributes to the general confidentiality property of the systems. To support the business 
asset (e.g. Credentials), the IS assets are defined using the actor (e.g. System) and plan (e.g. 
Submit login and password, Grant access to database) constructs. In order to Grant access to 
database few resources need to be available (e.g. Credentials for the Submit login and 
password plan, Access acknowledgement, Database). 
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Figure 8: To reach his goal User credentials received, a threat agent (e.g. Violator) performs 
the attack method (e.g. Submit login and password). In this way the attacker exploits the 
vulnerability points (characteristic of plans Submit login and password, Grant access to 
database) and targets (e.g. attacks) the Credentials. 
Figure 9: To mitigate this security event, plan Block IP address is introduced. Plans Check 
login and password and Check number of submits are part of Compare to given number (n) 
which is itself part of Block IP address process. All this together reach the goal User 
credentials secured which satisfies Confidentiality of user credentials. Satisfied security 
criterion mitigates the risk (e.g. Stealing user credentials). 
 
FIGURE 8: SECURE TROPOS - RISK-RELATED CONCEPTS 
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FIGURE 9: SECURE TROPOS - RISK TREATMENT-RELATED CONCEPTS 
3.3 Misuse Cases (MUC) 
Misuse Case is a business process-modeling tool used in the software development industry. The 
term Misuse Case or misuse case is derived from and is the inverse of use case. Use case's 
specify required behavior of software and other products under development, and are essentially 
structured stories or scenarios detailing the normal behavior and usage of the software. A Misuse 
Case on the other hand highlights something that should not happen (i.e. a Negative Scenario) 
and the threats hence identified, help in defining new requirements, which are expressed as new 
Use Cases [9]. 
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FIGURE 10: MISUSE CASES - ASSET-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 10: In this figure actor User communicates to the System for Submit login and 
password. The security criterion Confidentiality of credentials is introduced as a constraint of 
Submit login and password. The use case Send access acknowledgement includes use case 
Grant database access that is understood as IS asset. 
Figure 11: The misuser (e.g. Violator) uses a threat method (e.g. misuse case Submit login and 
password). The IS asset Grant database access is threatened because it has a vulnerability that 
Infinite number of submits allowed. The security event leads to the impact, which is defined as 
User credentials are stolen. This impact harms the business asset (e.g. Submit login and 
password) and negates its security criterion (e.g. Confidentiality of credentials). 
Figure 12: To mitigate the identified system misuse, a security use case – Block IP address is 
introduced. It consists of the use case Compare to given number (n) which itself includes use 
cases Check login and password and Check number of submits. The mitigation is carried on 
through the misuse case Submit login and password. 
17 
 
 
FIGURE 11: MISUSE CASES - RISK-RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
FIGURE 12: MISUSE CASES - RISK TREATMENT-RELATED CONCEPTS 
3.4 Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAL) 
Mal-activity diagrams are proposed as an extension of the UML activity diagrams to model a 
harmful behavior of security attackers. A basic way to build a mal-activity diagram is to model a 
normal process first, then to add unwanted behavior using mal-activities, mal-swimlane and mal-
decision constructs [10]. 
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FIGURE 13: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS - ASSET-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 13: In this figure activities (e.g. Submit login and password, Receive access granted 
acknowledgement) performed under the User swimlane could be understood as the valuable 
business asset. This process is supported by the IS assets characterized as swimlane System 
including activities Grant access to database, Send access granted acknowledgement and 
swimlane Security Module including gateway Are login and password correct. During this 
login process the Credentials are submitted to the Security module and then passed to the 
System. 
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FIGURE 14: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS - RISK-RELATED CONCEPTS 
Figure 14: In order to receive User credentials, the threat agent (e.g. swimlane Violator) uses 
credentials submit software (e.g. the attack software) as the means to execute attack. If the event 
is successful, it leads to the impact, such that the login and password were submitted (e.g. harm 
to the IS asset) and the credentials are captured and sent to the violator (e.g. harm to the business 
asset). These two aspects of the impact are expressed using the mal-activities contained in the 
Attack software swimlane. By sending the credentials to the Violator, Attack software also 
negates the Confidentiality of credentials. 
Figure 15: The security requirements Check number of submits and Block IP address are 
introduced to mitigate the identified risk. Check number of submits is introduced immediately 
after the Are login and password correct and has two possible outcomes. So does the first one. 
Negative outcome returns to activity Submit login and password and positive – to security 
requirement Block IP address. This security requirement is defined in the swimlane Security 
module that corresponds to a security control. 
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3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced four security modeling languages: BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse 
cases and Mal-activity diagrams. We have observed constructs of each of these languages 
applied to one particular case study of a random login process regarding asset, risk and risk-
treatment concepts. Moreover we pointed out how differently could four languages express the 
same aspect (e.g. Actor, Threat, Security requirements etc.).  
In the next chapter we will introduce the empirical comparison on these four languages that has 
been carried out. We will define the goal of the study, introduce the audience, describe the 
process of the study and, moreover, present the results. 
 
FIGURE 15: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS - RISK TREATMENT-RELATED CONCEPTS 
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4 Empirical Comparison 
4.1 Study design 
In order to answer our research question we needed to evaluate how human stakeholders 
perceive the IS security risk modelling languages presented in Chapter 3. To complete this task 
we have conducted an empirical study within the University of Tartu. Our scope included 48 
students attending the course “Principles of Secure Software Design” [12] at year 2014 (case 1) 
and also 39 students attending the same course at year 2013 (case 2). All of them were graduate 
(1st year of Master’s degree, overall 4th year of university curriculum). 
The course included lectures and practice sessions on principles of the security risk management, 
risk modelling, security requirements, model driven security, and development processes of the 
secure software. Supporting and explaining reading material was also presented to the students, 
as well as main principles of risk analysis and assessment, and the ISSRM domain model [7]. 
The models based on the case study were then presented to the students. The models of each 
modelling language included 4 different diagrams, which consisted of asset-related concepts, 
risk-related concepts, risk treatment-related concepts, and all 3 combined. Each 4 models of 
every introduced language were followed by the questionnaire. The study included 2 major 
phases. In first phase, students were asked to analyze the presented models and indicate the exact 
ISSRM concepts expressed there and fill in the 1st part of the questionnaire. For example, the 
business asset was mostly described by Account Data field or related to it. Some aspects (e.g. IS 
asset) were described in the models using a combination of constructs. For instance IS asset in 
BPMN model was described by Submit login and password and Grant access to DB tasks. There 
is also the case that given models did not represent the Control concept and the survey 
participants had to write “not presented” in this particular example. 
In 2nd phase of the study, participants had to define the exact language constructs that were used 
to describe the asset, risk and risk treatment concepts. This phase assisted us in evaluating the 
comprehension of the SRM languages, as this part gave as understanding of whether the students 
fully understand the principles and legend of given languages. For example, the threat agent 
concept in Secure Tropos diagram was described using Actor construct. If some concept was 
described using a combination of constructs, all of them had to be specified in order to count it as 
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a correct answer (e.g. a Threat concept in Misuse case diagram was described using a 
combination of Misuser and Misuse case constructs). 
4.2 Results 
The total number of questionnaires filled was: 
 20 for Business Processes Model and Notation diagrams 
 18 for Secure Tropos diagrams 
 24 for Misuse case diagrams 
 24 for Mal-activity diagrams 
We have excluded the Control score for the Security Tropos model when calculating the total 
score for case 1 due its low value (0%). 
Model comprehension 
In Table 1 we present the results for the comprehension of the models which we created using 
the SRM languages. The score is calculated as the percentage of the correct replies left by the 
respondents. For example, the IS asset concept in Asset concepts group for Secure Tropos is 
80% which means that only 80% of respondents (8 out of 10 in this particular case) correctly 
defined the IS concept (or a combination of them) in Secure Tropos model. For the overall score 
we calculated the average value for the exact row/column. The percentage written in blue 
indicates the global score for the percentage of correct replies regarding the model 
comprehension aspect. It is calculated as the average of the Overall column.  
Regarding the 1
st
 case, Table 1 indicates that eight ISSRM concepts (IS asset, Risk, Event, 
Threat, Threat Agent, Attack Method, Security Requirement, Control) were understood better 
from Mal-Activity diagrams, two concepts (Security Criterion, Vulnerability) from Misuse 
Cases, two concepts (Business asset, Impact) from Secure Tropos and one concept (Risk 
Treatment) from BPMN. In terms of model scores, the best perceived model was the Mal-
Activity Diagram which overall score for the model comprehension is 74%. According to the 
case 2 data, we can point out that the best perceived was the Secure Tropos model which overall 
score for the model comprehension was 79%. 
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TABLE 1: COMPREHENSION OF THE MODELS 
ISSRM Concepts Security risk-oriented  Overall 
2014 
Case 1 
Overall 
2013 
Case 2 
BPMN 
model 
Secure 
Tropos 
model 
Misuse 
case 
diagram 
Mal-
activity 
diagram 
Number of valid responses 13 10 14 10 47 39 
Asset 
concepts 
Business asset 62% 80% 57% 60% 65% 85% 
IS asset 92% 80% 64% 100% 84% 64% 
Security criterion 77% 90% 100% 90% 89% 94% 
Risk 
concepts 
Risk 38% 20% 43% 60% 40% 47% 
Impact 85% 90% 71% 80% 81% 75% 
Event 46% 40% 57% 70% 53% 60% 
Vulnerability 62% 40% 79% 60% 60% 61% 
Threat 38% 50% 64% 80% 58% 53% 
Threat agent 85% 80% 86% 90% 85% 94% 
Attack method 46% 60% 57% 80% 61% 69% 
Risk 
treatment 
concepts 
Risk treatment 77% 50% 71% 70% 67% 54% 
Security 
requirement 
46% 50% 64% 70% 58% 54% 
Control 23% 0% 14% 50% 29% 7% 
Overall 2014 (Case 1) 57% 61% 64% 74% 64% - 
Overall 2013 (Case 2) 74% 79% 63% 54% - 63% 
 
In terms of the exact ISSRM concepts for the both cases the best understood ones were Security 
criterion and Threat agent (case 1 – 89% and 85%, case 2 – 94% and 94%). The concept which 
received the lowest score was Control for the both cases (29% and 7% respectively). The global 
scores regarding the model comprehension aspect were relatively the same for both cases (case 1 
– 64%, case 2 – 63%). 
Language constructs 
In Table 2 we introduce the results for the understanding of the language constructs of the SRM 
languages which were used to constructs the models. The score is calculated as the percentage of 
construct definitions written correctly by the respondents. The IS asset concept construct in Asset 
concepts group for Secure Tropos is 70% which means that 70% of respondents (7 out of 10 in 
this case) correctly defined what language construct (or combination of them) was used to 
express IS asset in Secure Tropos model. For the overall score we calculated the average value 
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for the exact row/column. The percentage written in blue indicates the global score for the 
percentage of correct replies regarding the language constructs aspect. It is calculated as the 
average of the Overall column. 
TABLE 2: LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTS 
ISSRM Concepts Security risk-oriented Overall 
2014 
Case 1 
Overall 
2013 
Case 2 
BPMN 
model 
Secure 
Tropos 
model 
Misuse 
case 
diagram 
Mal-
activity 
diagram 
Number of valid 
responses 
13 10 14 10 47 39 
Asset 
concepts 
Business 
asset 
46% 80% 36% 30% 48% 46% 
IS asset 77% 70% 43% 50% 60% 30% 
Security 
criterion 
15% 80% 79% 50% 56% 36% 
Risk 
concepts 
Risk 46% 10% 43% 30% 32% 33% 
Impact 46% 20% 57% 50% 43% 24% 
Event 54% 30% 21% 20% 31% 19% 
Vulnerability 54% 20% 71% 20% 41% 41% 
Threat 38% 30% 57% 20% 36% 35% 
Threat agent 77% 70% 64% 40% 63% 53% 
Attack 
method 
62% 30% 71% 40% 51% 28% 
Risk 
treatment 
concepts 
Risk 
treatment 
38% 10% 43% 30% 30% 37% 
Security 
requirement 
62% 40% 43% 50% 49% 32% 
Control 38% 0% 29% 30% 32% 29% 
Overall 2014 (Case 1) 50% 41% 51% 35% 44% - 
Overall 2013 (Case 2) 52% 24% 47% 9% - 34% 
Regarding the 1st case, Table 2 reveals that language constructs for six ISSRM concepts (IS 
asset, Risk, Event, Threat agent, Security requirement, Control) were better understood by 
respondents reviewing BPMN model, constructs for two concepts (Business asset, Security 
criterion) reviewing Secure Tropos model, and constructs for five concepts (Impact, 
Vulnerability, Threat, Attack method, Risk treatment) reviewing Misuse Case model. In terms of 
model scores, we can point out that for the both cases the best perceived models regarding their 
language constructs are the Misuse Case diagram and BPMN model (case 1 – 51% and 50%, 
case 2 – 47% and 52%). Threat agent language construct was understood better than the others 
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regarding both case 1 and case 2 (63% and 53% respectively). The concept which received the 
lowest scores were Risk treatment for the 1st case (30%) and Event for the 2nd case (19%). The 
global scores regarding the language constructs aspect are 44% for case 1 and 34% for case 2. 
4.3 Threats to Validity 
One possible threat could be an insufficient knowledge of the four SRM languages which were 
used to create the models. In order to mitigate, we provided respondents with a study material 
including principles of ISSRM domain model, the domain model itself (introduce in Fig. 1), and 
also the basics of RM process (as shown in Fig. 2). Another threat to validity is that participants 
had lack of motivation to assess the given SRM languages and their models. To mitigate, they 
were rewarded with the subject points, however, of a small amount [7]. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we presented the empirical research that has been conducted within the University 
of Tartu. We also introduced the study design as well as the audience. Moreover, we 
demonstrated the research results which were achieved by analyzing the collected data. Finally, 
we outlined possible threats to validity. 
In the last chapter we will conclude our research by answering our main research question. In 
addition to it we will discuss the limitations and possible future work which could be done 
regarding our research. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper we introduced principles of SRM as well as four SRM languages – BPMN [5], 
Secure Tropos [8], Misuse Cases [9], Mal-Activity Diagrams [10]. We used them to create the 
models which were forwarded to the audience in order to understand how human stakeholders 
perceive the ISSRM concepts and the SRM language constructs. We conclude our study by 
answering our main research question. 
During our research we have faced limitations that had impact on quality of the results as well as 
ability to answer the research question. Firstly, we received only 86 replies which is insignificant 
amount and cannot give the exactly correct answer for our research question. In addition to it, 
some of the replies were not filled appropriately so it was difficult to outline whether it was done 
on purpose or not. 
All in all, the best understood models in terms of comprehension are Mal-Activity Diagram 
(overall score 74%) for the 1
st
 case and Secure Tropos model (overall score 79%) for the 2
nd
 
case. However, the difference between Mal-Activity Diagram and Misuse Case (case 1) is only 
10% when they had different number of respondents (10 and 14 respectively). We can also point 
out that the best understood model regarding both case 1 and case 2 is Secure Tropos model 
(average score for both cases – 70%). The best perceived ISSRM concepts are Security criterion 
and Threat agent (both cases). 
We have found that the best perceived model in terms of SRM language constructs was the 
Misuse Case (case 1 - overall score 51%). However, the difference between Misuse case 
diagrams and BPMN model is only 1% which cannot be counted as significant distinction. 
Moreover, Misuse Case and BPMN have the highest score in terms of language constructs aspect 
regarding both case 1 and case 2. In relation to ISSRM concepts, Threat agent language 
construct is understood better than the other concerning both cases (63% and 53%). 
Such results can be explained by the fact that some concepts (e.g. Threat agent, IS asset) are 
relatively simple regarding their definitions compared to composite concepts (e.g. Threat, Risk) 
that appear to be a combination of two or more other concepts. It outlines the limitations of the 
languages which were not initially designed, but extended to comply with terms of SRM. 
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As future work, we plan to expand the study by collecting and analyzing more data regarding the 
model comprehension and language constructs. We need to proceed to a deeper analysis of the 
languages that appeared to be better than the other in terms of model comprehension and 
language construct aspects. We also need to create a tool capable of transforming a model 
created using one SRM language to another. 
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Appendix 
I. Attachements 
  What is …? (ISSRM concepts) Which language construct express …? 
A
ss
et
 
Business 
asset 
  
IS asset 
 
  
Security  
criterion 
  
Risk 
 
  
Impact 
 
  
Event 
 
  
Vulnerability 
 
  
Threat 
 
  
Threat agent 
 
  
Attack method 
 
  
Risk treatment 
decision 
  
Security 
requirement 
  
Control 
 
  
APPENDIX 1: SURVEY FORM FOR ALL OF THE PRESENTED MODELS 
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APPENDIX 2: BPMN - ASSET 
 
APPENDIX 3: BPMN – RISK 
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APPENDIX 4: BPMN - RISK-TREATMENT 
 
APPENDIX 5: SECURE TROPOS – ASSET 
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APPENDIX 6: SECURE TROPOS - RISK 1 
 
APPENDIX 7: SECURE TROPOS - RISK 2 
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APPENDIX 8: SECURE TROPOS - RISK-TREATMENT 
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APPENDIX 9: MISUSE CASE – ASSET 
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APPENDIX 10: MISUSE CASE – RISK 
  
37 
 
 
APPENDIX 11: MISUSE CASE - RISK-TREATMENT 
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APPENDIX 12: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAM – ASSET 
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APPENDIX 13: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAM – RISK 
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APPENDIX 14: MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAM - RISK-TREATMENT 
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ISSRM Concepts Security risk-oriented  Overa
ll BPM
N 
mode
l 
Secure 
Tropos 
model 
Misuse 
case 
diagrams 
Mal-
activity 
diagrams 
Number of valid responses 7 8 10 14 39 
Asset 
concepts 
Business asset 86% 100% 60% 93% 85% 
IS asset 43% 100% 50% 64% 64% 
Security criterion 100% 100% 90% 86% 94% 
Risk 
concepts 
Risk 43% 75% 40% 29% 47% 
Impact 100% 88% 70% 43% 75% 
Event 57% 75% 50% 57% 60% 
Vulnerability 71% 88% 70% 14% 61% 
Threat 71% 63% 50% 29% 53% 
Threat agent 100% 100% 90% 86% 94% 
Attack method 86% 63% 70% 57% 69% 
Risk 
treatmen
t 
concepts 
Risk treatment 57% 50% 60% 50% 54% 
Security 
requirement 
71% 50% 50% 43% 54% 
Control 0% 0% 0% 29% 7% 
Overall 74% 79% 63% 54% 63% 
APPENDIX 15: COMPREHENSION OF THE MODELS 2013 
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ISSRM Concepts Security risk-oriented Overa
ll BPM
N 
mode
l 
Secure 
Tropos 
model 
Misuse 
case 
diagrams 
Mal-
activity 
diagrams 
Number of valid responses 7 8 10 14 39 
Asset 
concepts 
Business asset 86% 38% 70% 7% 46% 
IS asset 29% 38% 40% 14% 30% 
Security criterion 43% 38% 50% 14% 36% 
Risk 
concepts 
Risk 57% 25% 50% 0% 33% 
Impact 43% 13% 40% 0% 24% 
Event 43% 13% 40% 0% 19% 
Vulnerability 29% 25% 20% 0% 41% 
Threat 57% 25% 50% 7% 35% 
Threat agent 100% 38% 60% 14% 53% 
Attack method 29% 25% 50% 7% 28% 
Risk 
treatmen
t 
concepts 
Risk treatment 43% 13% 50% 43% 37% 
Security 
requirement 
71% 25% 25% 7% 32% 
Control 43% 0% 60% 7% 29% 
Overall 52% 24% 47% 9% 34% 
APPENDIX 16: LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTS 2013 
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